ÿþ<html> <title> Sunghoon Hong&#8217;s Homepage </title> <body style="line-height:1.5em;"> <p style="text-align:center"> <font size="6"> Sunghoon Hong&#8217;s Homepage </font> <br/><br/><br/> <img src="SunghoonHong.jpg" width=265 height=250> </p> I am a job market candidate in the <a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/">Department of Economics</a> at <a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/">Vanderbilt University</a>. I am working with Professor <a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty/Wooders/index.html">Myrna Wooders</a>. <br/><br/> I am studying network economics. Networks between agents, such as consumers, firms, and governments, can affect their economic activities. For example, the exchange of information through social networks can affect the behavior of consumers. The transmission of bads through transportation networks can affect the behavior of public agencies as well as the movement of goods and people. My research aims to understand the effects of networks on economic activities. <br/><br/> My job market paper <a href="http://www.sunghoonhong.com/NetBads-March2012.pdf">&#8220;Network Bads: How Bottlenecks Matter&#8221;</a> analyzes strategic behavior in the presence of bads transmitted through a network. Infectious diseases and financial liquidity shocks can be examples of network bads. Two agents can act to decrease the transmission of bads. One agent can act to mitigate bads at a source while the other agent can act to reduce bads through the network. Each agent incurs the cost of action but benefits from the decrease in network bads. <br/><br/> The structure of the network determines bottlenecks, which affect the transmission of bads and the behavior of agents. Because agents behave strategically, equilibrium outcomes may not be efficient. Inefficiency can be caused by the followings: <br/> &nbsp;&nbsp; 1) Insufficient action: The equilibrium level of action is less than the efficient level. <br/> &nbsp;&nbsp; 2) Equilibrium miscasting: The agent who acts in an equilibrium may not be the agent who must act in the efficient profile. <br/> &nbsp;&nbsp; 3) Equilibrium inertia: There may be an inefficient equilibrium where neither agent acts. <br/><br/> Cooperative approaches through transfers between agents can help achieve efficiency. Sharing human resources and monetary funds can be examples of transfers. During the outbreak of SARS in 2003, by sharing human resources, public health agencies worked together to prevent the transmission of the disease. Also, in the ongoing debt crisis, European governments are seeking cooperative agreements including the creation and expansion of a bailout fund to resolve the crisis. In these contexts it is important to understand how to align interests of different agents through transfers. Please see related articles: <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/21522461">Financial Contagion</a>; <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/21534851">Euro Deal</a>; <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693392/">SARS Outbreak</a> <br/><br/> Here is my CV: <a href="http://www.sunghoonhong.com/VU_CV_SunghoonHong_Oct2011.pdf">Curriculum Vitae (as of October 2011)</a> <br/><br/> My e-mail address is sunghoon (dot) hong (at) vanderbilt (dot) edu. <br/><br/> Published Papers<br/> &nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/84340kl846q6472t/">&#8220;Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations&#8221;</a> with Katherine Cuff, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen, and John Weymark, Social Choice and Welfare (Forthcoming).<br/> &nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/l2141k802537630m/">&#8220;Efficiency and Stability in a Model of Wireless Communication Networks&#8221;</a> with Youngsub Chun, Social Choice and Welfare (2010) 34(3):441--454. <br/><br/> Working Papers<br/> &nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868144">&#8220;Strategic Network Interdiction&#8221;</a> <br/><br/> Work in Progress<br/> &nbsp;&nbsp;&#8220;The Power Law of Conflict&#8221; with John Wooders. <br/><br/> Links<br/> <a href="http://www.google.com/">Google</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.gmail.com/">Gmail</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/">VU</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/">VU Econ</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://email.vanderbilt.edu/owa">Vmail</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/">VU Library</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.econometricsociety.org/">Econometric Society</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://www.gametheorysociety.org/">Game Theory Society</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br/><br/><br/> <p style="text-align:center">Updated in March 2012 by Sunghoon Hong</p> </body> </html>